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Abstract
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature,
users compete for a divisible resource – such as bandwidth – by submitting bids. The mechanism
allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount
equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a propor-
tional allocation game. Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of
equilibria in this game with respect to the social welfare and presented a lower bound of 26.8% on
the price of anarchy over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete
information settings, respectively. In this paper, we improve this bound to 50% over both equilib-
rium concepts. Our analysis is simpler and, furthermore, we argue that it cannot be improved by
arguments that do not take the equilibrium structure into account. We also extend it to settings with
budget constraints where we show the first constant bound (between 36% and 50%) on the price of
anarchy of the corresponding game with respect to an effective welfare benchmark that takes budgets
into account.
Keywords: algorithmic game theory, price of anarchy, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, proportional allo-
cation mechanism
1 Introduction
The proportional allocation mechanism, introduced by Kelly [11], is fundamental in the network op-
timization literature. According to this mechanism, a divisible resource — such as bandwidth of a
communication link — is allocated to users as follows. Each user submits a bid to the mechanism; this
corresponds to the user’s willingness-to-pay for sharing the resource. The mechanism allocates to each
user a fraction of the resource that is equal to the ratio of her bid over the total amount of bids. It also
receives a payment from each user that is equal to her bid. This naturally defines a proportional alloca-
tion game among the users who act as players; each player has a (typically concave, non-negative, and
non-decreasing) valuation function for the resource share she receives and aims to maximize her utility,
i.e., her value for the resource share minus her payment to the mechanism. As it is typically the case
in games, the social welfare (i.e., the total value of the players for the resource share they receive) at
equilibria is, in general, suboptimal.
We aim to quantify this inefficiency of equilibria by bounding the price of anarchy [12] of propor-
tional allocation games. Besides the well-known work of Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] who considered pure
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Nash equilibria in the full information setting, there has been surprisingly little focus on price of anar-
chy bounds over more general equilibrium concepts. The only exception we are aware of is the recent
work of Syrgkanis and Tardos [22] who studied proportional allocation as part of a broader class of
mechanisms. Motivated by their work, we present new bounds on the price of anarchy of proportional
allocation under general equilibrium concepts, such as coarse-correlated equilibria in the full informa-
tion setting and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete information setting. In particular, we prove that
the social welfare at equilibria is at least 1/2 of the optimal social welfare. The bound holds for coarse-
correlated and pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full information and Bayesian setting, respectively, and
improves the bound of 26.8% of [22]. The proof is conceptually simple and is obtained by bounding
the utility of every player at equilibrium by the utility this player would have by deviating to a particular
deterministic bid.
We also consider the scenario where players have budget constraints representing their ability-to-
pay. Here, each player has a budget and is never allowed to bid above it. We assess the quality of
equilibria in this case in terms of an effective welfare benchmark — proposed in previous work but
further refined here — that takes budgets into account. We show that the effective welfare at equilibrium
is at least a constant fraction of the optimal one. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first constant
price of anarchy bound (in particular, between 36% and 50%) with respect to this benchmark1. Again,
our proofs follow by considering a single deterministic deviation for each player, defined in a slightly
different way compared to the deviation we consider in our bound on the social welfare.
Related work. The proportional allocation mechanism and its variations have received significant
attention in the network optimization literature. Proportional allocation games have been considered in
[7, 13, 14] where the existence and uniqueness conditions for pure Nash equilibria are proved. Variations
of the mechanism with different definitions for the allocation rule or the payments have been considered
in [15, 16, 17, 20] (see also the discussion in [8]).
Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] were the first who assessed the quality of proportional allocations in terms
of the social welfare. They focused on pure Nash equilibria and proved a lower bound of 3/4 on their
price of anarchy. Their analysis is based on the important observation that a pure Nash equilibrium in a
proportional allocation game is also a pure Nash equilibrium in a game where each player has a linear
valuation function with slope equal to the derivative of the original valuation function at the share value
they get at equilibrium. The optimal social welfare in the new game is not smaller than the original
one and this allows them to consider the significantly simpler case of linear valuations in their analysis.
Then, the price of anarchy bound is obtained by solving a linear program. An alternative proof to the
result of [9] without using this argument is presented in [18] (see also [8]).
Unfortunately, this transformation does not apply to more general equilibrium concepts since the
resource share each player receives is, in general, a random variable. This is a rather common difficulty
that manifests itself in the analysis of games, as we depart from pure Nash equilibria and full information.
In particular, Bayes-Nash equilibria have such an extremely rich structure that, typically, the price of
anarchy analysis assesses their quality by rather ignoring this structure. Instead, it resorts to bounding
the utility of each player by appropriately selected deviations which reveal a relation between the social
welfare at equilibrium and the optimal social welfare. This approach has been used in a series of papers
that mostly focus on auctions (e.g., see [1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 19, 22]) and is actually the approach we follow in
the current paper as well.
Syrgkanis and Tardos [22] present a general analysis framework for the broad class of smooth mech-
anisms. Among other results, they show a price of anarchy lower bound of 26.8% over coarse-correlated
and mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria of proportional allocation games. In their analysis, they bound the util-
ity of each player by the utility she would have by deviating to an appropriately defined randomized bid
1Previously, Syrgkanis and Tardos [22] had shown that the social welfare at equilibria is at least 2 −√3 ≈ 26.8% of the
optimal effective welfare. Our techniques can be used to improve this particular guarantee to 1/2.
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(an approach that has also been used in different contexts in [2, 10, 21, 23]) with a probability distri-
bution that depends only on the optimal allocation and the valuation function of the player. In contrast,
the deviating bid we consider depends on the bid strategies at equilibrium (this is in the same spirit as
the recent analysis of Feldman et al. [6]) and, more interestingly, it is deterministic. In particular, it is
defined as the product of the (expected) resource share a bidder receives in the optimal allocation and
the expectation of bids of the other players at equilibrium.
Budget constraints are well-motivated in auction settings. In a slightly different context than ours,
the effective welfare benchmark is considered by Dobzinski and Paes Leme, who call it liquid welfare
in [5]. In proportional allocation, Syrgkanis and Tardos [22] prove that the social welfare at equilibrium
is a constant fraction of the optimal effective welfare. Note that our guarantee is considerably stronger
as we compare directly the effective welfare at equilibrium with its optimal value.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary definitions in
Section 2. Our price of anarchy bounds in terms of the social welfare are proved in Section 3. There, we
also argue that in order to improve our analysis, radically new ideas are required. The budget-constrained
setting is studied in Section 4. We remark that we have not mentioned mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria in
the above presentation of our results. Actually, we have observed that such equilibria coincide with
pure ones even in the budget-constrained setting. We discuss related issues as well as additional open
problems in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Each player (henceforth called bidder) i in a proportional allocation game has a concave2 non-decreasing
valuation function vi : [0, 1] → R+. A strategy for bidder i is simply a non-negative bid. Given a bid
vector b = (b1, b2, ..., bn), with one bid per bidder, the proportional allocation mechanism allocates
to each bidder a fraction of the resource that is proportional to the bid submitted by her. Denoting by
di the resource share that is allocated to bidder i, it is di = bi∑
j bj
. We often use the notation B−i to
denote the sum of bids of all bidders besides i (hence, di = bibi+B−i ). The utility of bidder i from an
allocation is simply the difference of her value for the fraction of the resource she gets minus her bid,
i.e., ui(b) = vi(di)− bi.
A bid vector b is a pure equilibrium if the utility of all bidders is maximized, given the bid strategies
of the other bidders. So, in a pure equilibrium, no bidder has any incentive to deviate to another strategy.
Denoting by (b′i,b−i) the bid vector that is obtained from b when bidder i unilaterally deviates to bid
strategy b′i, we can express this condition as ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
The social welfare of an allocation d is the total value of bidders for the resource shares they receive,
i.e., SW (d) =
∑
i vi(di). We denote by SW ∗ the maximum value of the social welfare over all possible
allocations. The price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria is defined as the minimum value of the social
welfare among all pure Nash equilibria divided by the optimal social welfare.
The bid strategy of a bidder i can be randomized. In this case, bi is a random variable and the
bidder aims to maximize her expected utility E [ui(b)]. The bid strategies of different bidders can be
independent or correlated. A vector of independent randomized bid strategies is called a mixed Nash
equilibrium if it simultaneously maximizes the expected utility of each bidder, given the bid strategies
of the other bidders. More generally, coarse-correlated equilibria are solution concepts that capture
correlated bid strategies. A vector of (possibly correlated) bid strategies is called a coarse-correlated
equilibrium if no bidder has any incentive to unilaterally deviate to any deterministic bid strategy in
order to improve her expected utility (again, given the strategies of the other bidders). The notion of the
2Very recently, Correa et al. [4] studied proportional allocation games in the less standard scenario of non-concave valuation
functions.
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price of anarchy naturally extends to these solution concepts as well. For example, the price of anarchy
over correlated equilibria is defined as the minimum value of the expected social welfare among all
coarse-correlated equilibria divided by the optimal social welfare.
The above setting is known as the full (or complete) information setting. We consider the incomplete
information (or Bayesian) setting as well; in this case, the valuation function vi of each bidder i is drawn
randomly (and independently from the other bidders) from a probability distribution Fi over concave,
non-decreasing, and non-negative functions in [0, 1]. Again, bidder i aims to maximize her expected
utility for each possible valuation function vi drawn from Fi. In the incomplete information setting,
each bidder i bases her decision on her exact valuation vi and on the probability distributions according
to which other bidders draw their valuations (and their corresponding bid strategies); these distributions
are common knowledge.
So, the bid strategy of bidder i is a (possibly random) bid function bi(vi). A vector with one such
strategy per bidder (with independence between bid strategies of different bidders) is called a mixed
Bayes-Nash equilibrium if no bidder has any incentive to deviate to some other bid for any valuation
function drawn from Fi. In pure Bayes-Nash equilibria, bidders use deterministic bid functions. The
price of anarchy over Bayes-Nash equilibria is defined as the minimum value of the expected social
welfare among all Bayes-Nash equilibria divided by the expectation of the optimal social welfare. With
some abuse in notation, we also use SW ∗ to denote the expectation of the optimal social welfare in the
Bayesian setting.
We also extend the above model by adding budget constraints to the bidders. In this setting, each
bidder i has a non-negative budget ci and she is never allowed to bid above her budget. This restriction
can result to equilibria that have extremely low social welfare compared to the optimal one (whose
definition does not take budgets into account). Following [22] and [5], we use the effective welfare
benchmark in order to assess the quality of equilibria with budget-constrained bidders. The effective
welfare of a (deterministic) allocation d = (d1, d2, ..., dn) is defined as EW (d) =
∑
imin{vi(di), ci}.
Note that the definition is similar to the definition of the social welfare; the important difference is
that the value of each bidder is capped by her budget. We extend this definition to random allocations
d as EW (d) =
∑
imin{E [vi(di)] , ci}. We denote by EW ∗ the maximum value of the effective
welfare over all allocations. The price of anarchy with respect to the effective welfare benchmark (over
equilibria in a given class) is the minimum value of the effective welfare (among all allocations induced
by equilibria in the class) divided by the optimal effective welfare.
In the Bayesian setting, both the budget ci of bidder i and her valuation vi are drawn randomly
according to the probability distribution Fi. We refine the effective welfare benchmark in this case as
EW (d) =
∑
i
E(vi,ci)∼Fi
[
min{E(v−i,c−i)∼F−i [vi(di)] , ci}
]
,
where the inner expectation is taken over the valuation-budget value pairs of the other bidders once the
pair for bidder i has been fixed (and over the corresponding bid strategies). In order to simplify notation
in the proofs below, we will not explicitly use the subscripts in the expectations.
3 Bounding the social welfare of equilibria
In this section, we prove the price of anarchy bounds with respect to the social welfare. We consider
both coarse-correlated equilibria in the full information setting as well as pure Bayes-Nash equilibria
in the Bayesian setting. Our proofs use the following lemma which bounds the utility of a bidder at a
deterministic deviation. We also use this lemma later in Section 4 where we study budget-constrained
bidders.
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Lemma 3.1 Consider a bidder with a concave and non-decreasing valuation function v : [0, 1] → R+
and let Γ be the random variable denoting the sum of bids of the other bidders. Then, for every z ∈ [0, 1]
and for every µ > 0, the expected utility the bidder would have by deviating to the deterministic bid
µzE [Γ] is at least 3µ−14µ v(z)− µzE [Γ].
Proof. It suffices to show that the expected value of the bidder when she deviates to the deterministic
bid y = µzE [Γ] is at least 3µ−14µ v(z). Define the event T :=
{
Γ ≥ y (1
z
− 1)}. When T is false, we
have y
y+Γ > z and, since v is non-decreasing, we clearly have that
v
(
y
y + Γ
)
≥ v(z).
Otherwise, when T is true, y
y+Γ ∈ [0, z]. Since v is concave and non-negative, its value in [0, z] is
lower-bounded by the line connecting points (0, 0) and (z, v(z)). Hence,
v
(
y
y + Γ
)
≥ y
y + Γ
· v(z)
z
.
So, we can bound the expected value of the bidder when she deviates to the deterministic bid y using
the two observation above and linearity of expectation.
E
[
v
(
y
y + Γ
)]
= E
[
v
(
y
y + Γ
)
1T
]
+ E
[
v
(
y
y + Γ
)
1T
]
≥ E [v(z)1T ]+ E
[
y
y + Γ
· v(z)
z
1T
]
= v(z)(1 − Pr[T ]) + v(z)
z
E
[
y
y + Γ
1T
]
. (1)
Here, we have used the notation X1T to denote the random variable that is equal to X if T is true and
is zero otherwise.
We will now work with the rightmost term of the above right-hand side expression. Since the func-
tion y
y+Γ is convex with respect to Γ, we can apply Jensen’s inequality to obtain that
E
[
y
y + Γ
1T
]
= E
[
y
y + Γ
|T
]
· Pr[T ] ≥ yPr[T ]
y + E [Γ|T ]
and, since E [X|T ] ≤ E[X]Pr[T ] for every random variable X, we have
E
[
y
y + Γ
1T
]
≥ yPr[T ]
2
yPr[T ] + E [Γ]
≥ yPr[T ]
2
y + E [Γ]
.
The second inequality follows trivially since Pr[T ] ≤ 1. Substituting y and using the fact that z ≤ 1,
we get
E
[
y
y + Γ
1T
]
≥ µz Pr[T ]
2
1 + µz
≥ µz
µ+ 1
Pr[T ]2. (2)
Now, using (1), (2), and the fact that 1− α+ µ
µ+1α
2 ≥ 3µ−14µ for every α, we obtain that
E
[
v
(
y
y + Γ
)]
≥ v(z)
(
1− Pr[T ] + µ
µ+ 1
Pr[T ]2
)
≥ 3µ − 1
4µ
v(z),
as desired. ⊓⊔
We are ready to prove our price of anarchy bounds. We begin with the case of coarse-correlated
equilibria in the full information setting which is much simpler.
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Theorem 3.2 The price of anarchy of proportional allocation games over coarse-correlated equilibria
is at least 1/2.
Proof. Consider a full information proportional allocation game with n bidders in which bidder i has
valuation function vi and denote by xi the resource fraction bidder i gets in the optimal allocation. Let b
be a coarse-correlated equilibrium that induces a random allocation d = (d1, ..., dn) and let B =
∑
i bi
be the random variable denoting the sum of bids of all bidders, with B−i being the sum of bids of all
bidders besides bidder i. Since b is a coarse-correlated equilibrium, bidder i has no incentive to deviate
to any deterministic bid (including the deviating bid xiE [B−i]). By applying Lemma 3.1 for bidder i
with z = xi, µ = 1 and Γ = B−i, we obtain that
E [ui(b)] ≥ E [ui(xiE [B−i] ,b−i)] ≥ 1
2
vi(xi)− xiE [B−i] .
Summing over all bidders and using the fact that B−i ≤ B for every bidder i, we have
∑
i
E [ui(b)] ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(xi)−
∑
i
xiE [B−i] (3)
≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(xi)−
∑
i
xiE [B]
=
1
2
SW ∗ − E [B] .
The theorem follows by this inequality since the social welfare equals the sum of bidders’ utilities plus
their bids, i.e., E [SW (d)] =
∑
i E [ui(b)] + E [B]. ⊓⊔
The last step of the proof above begins with inequality (3). Essentially, this inequality has the form
∑
i
E [ui(b)] ≥ λSW ∗ − µ
∑
i
xiE [B−i].
The price of anarchy bound of [22] follows after first proving an inequality of this type and then con-
cluding to a price of anarchy bound of λmax{1,µ} . The smoothness arguments of [22] lead to a version
of this inequality with λ = 2 − √3 and µ = 1. Here, we have been able to improve the parameters to
λ = 1/2 and µ = 1. The next lemma demonstrates that these parameters cannot be improved further.
Lemma 3.3 For every ǫ > 0, there exists a proportional allocation game such that for every λ, µ
satisfying
∑
i
ui(b) ≥ λSW ∗ − µ
∑
i
xiB−i (4)
where xi is the resource fraction of bidder i in the optimal allocation and B−i is the sum of bids of all
bidders besides bidder i at a (pure Nash) equilibrium, it holds that λmax{1,µ} ≤ 12 + ǫ.
Proof. Consider the proportional allocation game with n ≥ 2 bidders in which bidder 1 has valuation
v1(x) = x and bidder i has valuation vi(x) = n−12n−3x for i ≥ 2. We can show that the bids in the
(unique) pure Nash equilibrium are b1 = 1/4 and bi = 14(n−1) for i ≥ 2. Indeed, assuming that
this is true for all bidders besides i, it can be verified that the strategy y that maximizes the utility
ui(y, b−i) = vi
(
y
y+B−i
)
− y for bidder i satisfies y = bi. I.e., bidder 1 gets half of the resource and
the remaining bidders share the remaining resource equally. Hence, u1(b) = v1(1/2)− 1/4 = 1/4 and∑
i 6=1 ui(b) = (n− 1)
(
vi
(
1
2(n−1)
)
− 14(n−1)
)
= 14(2n−3) .
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In the optimal allocation, the whole resource is allocated to bidder 1, i.e., SW ∗ = 1, x1 = 1 and
xi = 0 for i ≥ 2. Hence, inequality (4) becomes
1
4
+
1
4(2n − 3) ≥ λ−
µ
4
which implies that λ ≤ max{1, µ}
(
1
2 +
1
4(2n−3)
)
. The lemma follows by setting n sufficiently large.
⊓⊔
The proof for Bayes-Nash equilibria follows the same general approach with that of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.4 The price of anarchy of proportional allocation games over pure Bayes-Nash equilibria
is at least 1/2.
Proof. Consider an incomplete information proportional allocation game in which the valuation func-
tion vi of bidder i is drawn from the probability distribution Fi, independently for each bidder. Let
xi be the random variable denoting the resource fraction bidder i gets in the optimal allocation. Let b
be a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium and B be the random variable denoting the sum of bids of all bid-
ders; again, B−i denotes the sum of bids of all bidders besides bidder i. Since b is a pure Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, bidder i has no incentive to deviate to any deterministic bid (including the deviating bid
E [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi]) when the valuation drawn from probability distribution Fi is vi. So, in all condi-
tional expectations below, we simply write vi to denote the event that the valuation vi drawn from Fi is
vi. By applying Lemma 3.1 for bidder i with z = E [xi|vi], µ = 1 and Γ = B−i, we obtain that
E [ui(b)|vi] ≥ E [ui(E [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi] ,b−i)|vi]
≥ 1
2
vi(E [xi|vi])− E [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi]
≥ 1
2
E [vi(xi)|vi]− E [xi|vi]E [B] .
The second inequality follows by Jensen’s inequality since the valuation function vi is concave and due
to the fact that in a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the bid of a bidder different than i does not depend
on the exact valuation of bidder i and, hence, E [B−i|vi] = E [B−i] ≤ E [B]. Considering all possible
valuations for bidder i that are drawn from probability distribution Fi, we have that her unconditional
expected utility is
E [ui(b)] ≥ 1
2
E [vi(xi)]− E [xi]E [B] .
Summing over all bidders and using the facts that
∑
i xi = 1 and B−i ≤ B for every bidder i, we
have
∑
i
E [ui(b)] ≥ 1
2
∑
i
E [vi(xi)]−
∑
i
xiE [B] =
1
2
SW ∗ − E [B] .
The theorem follows by this inequality since, again, the social welfare equals the sum of expected
bidders’ utilities plus the total amount of bids. ⊓⊔
4 Budget-constrained bidders
In this section, we consider budget-constrained bidders and prove a lower bound of approximately 36%
and an upper bound of 50% on the price of anarchy in terms of the effective welfare benchmark. Here, we
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prove Theorem 4.1 for Bayes-Nash equilibria only; the (simpler) proof for coarse-correlated equilibria
appears in Appendix A. Our upper bound (Theorem 4.2) applies even to pure Nash equilibria.
Before proceeding to the presentation of our bounds for budget-constrained bidders, we remark
that minor modifications of the proofs in the previous section can show that the social welfare over
equilibria with budget-constrained bidders is at least 1/2 of the optimal effective welfare, improving a
corresponding bound of 26.8% from [22]. The necessary modifications are as follows. First, we need
to define the deviating bids in terms of the resource shares in the allocation that maximizes the effective
welfare. Then, there is a subtle case where Lemma 3.1 cannot be used, namely when the deviating bid
for a bidder exceeds her budget. Fortunately, the inequality provided by Lemma 3.1 follows trivially in
this case (actually, we use this argument in the proof below). By repeating the analysis in the proofs of
Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, we can conclude that the social welfare at equilibrium is at least 1/2 of the social
welfare of the allocation that maximizes the effective welfare. The bound then follows by observing that
the effective welfare of this allocation is upper-bounded by its social welfare.
Theorem 4.1 The price of anarchy of proportional allocation games with budget-constrained bidders
over coarse-correlated or Bayes-Nash equilibria is at least 0.3596.
Proof. Let µ ∈ (1/3, 1] be a parameter whose exact value will be defined later. Consider an incomplete
information proportional allocation game with n bidders in which the valuation function vi and the
budget ci of bidder i are drawn from the probability distribution Fi, independently for each bidder. Let
xi be the random variable denoting the resource fraction bidder i gets in the allocation that maximizes
the effective welfare. Let b be a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium that induces a random allocation d =
(d1, ..., dn) and B be the random variable denoting the sum of bids of all bidders; again, B−i denotes the
sum of bids of all bidders besides bidder i. We denote by Ai the set that contains all pairs of a valuation
function and a corresponding budget value (vi, ci) that are drawn from the probability distribution Fi
and satisfy E [vi(di)|vi] ≤ ci. Consider a bidder i with valuation-budget pair (vi, ci) 6∈ Ai. By the
definition of Ai, we have
min{E [vi(di)|vi] , ci} ≥ min{E [vi(xi)|vi] , ci}.
By considering all valuation-budget pairs not belonging to Ai, we obtain
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai] ≥ E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai] ,
and summing over all bidders, we have
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai] ≥
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]. (5)
Now consider a valuation-budget pair (vi, ci) ∈ Ai for bidder i that is drawn from Fi. If
µE [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi] ≤ ci, we can bound the expected utility E [ui(b)|vi] by considering the devia-
tion of bidder i to bid µE [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi] (which is within bidder i’s budget ci). By Lemma 3.1, we
have
E [ui(b)|vi] ≥ 3µ − 1
4µ
vi(E [xi|vi])− µE [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi]
≥ 3µ − 1
4µ
E [vi(xi)|vi]− µE [xi|vi]E [B]
≥ 3µ − 1
4µ
min{E [vi(xi)|vi] , ci} − µE [xi|vi]E [B] .
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The second inequality follows by Jensen’s inequality and by the fact E [B−i|vi] = E [B−i]. Otherwise,
if µE [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi] > ci, the same inequality follows easily since
E [ui(b)|vi] ≥ 0
> ci − µE [xi|vi]E [B−i|vi]
≥ 3µ − 1
4µ
min{E [vi(xi)|vi] , ci} − µE [xi|vi]E [B] .
Hence, when (vi, ci) ∈ Ai, we have
E [ui(b)|vi] + µE [xi|vi]E [B] ≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
min{E [vi(xi)|vi] , ci}.
By considering all valuation-budget values belonging to Ai, we have
E [ui(b)1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µE [xi1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai]E [B] ≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] .
Using the obvious fact that E [xi] ≥ E [xi1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] and the above inequality, we obtain that
E [ui(b)1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µE [xi]E [B] ≥ E [ui(b)1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µE [xi1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai]E [B]
≥ 3µ − 1
4µ
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] . (6)
Now, we have
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µ
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]
≥
∑
i
E [ui(b) + bi1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µ
∑
i
E [bi1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]
≥
∑
i
E [ui(b) + µbi1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µ
∑
i
E [bi1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]
=
∑
i
E [ui(b)1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µE [B]
=
∑
i
(E [ui(b)1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µE [xi]E [B])
≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai]. (7)
The first inequality follows since the quantity min{E [vi(di)] , ci} equals E [vi(di)] when (vi, ci) ∈ Ai
and ci otherwise; in the latter case, the budget is clearly not smaller than the bid of bidder i. The second
inequality follows since µ ≤ 1, the two equalities are obvious, and the last inequality follows by (6).
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Now, using (5) and (7), we have
EW (d) =
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}]
=
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai] + µ
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]
+(1− µ)
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(di)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]
≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) ∈ Ai]
+(1− µ)
∑
i
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}1(vi, ci) 6∈ Ai]
≥ min
{
3µ − 1
4µ
, 1− µ
}∑
i
E [min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}]
= min
{
3µ − 1
4µ
, 1− µ
}
EW ∗.
Hence, the price of anarchy with respect to the effective welfare benchmark is bounded by the quantity
min
{
3µ−1
4µ , 1− µ
}
which is maximized to 7−
√
17
8 ≈ 0.3596 for µ = 1+
√
17
8 . ⊓⊔
We conclude this section by presenting our upper bound on the price of anarchy; note that it holds
even for pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.2 For every ǫ > 0, there exists a proportional allocation game among budget-constrained
bidders with price of anarchy at most 1/2 + ǫ over pure Nash equilibria, with respect to the effective
welfare benchmark.
Proof. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Consider a proportional allocation game with two bidders. Bidder 1 has valuation
v1(x) = x and budget c1 = α(1+α)2 . Bidder 2 has valuation v2(x) = αx and infinite budget. The state
in which bidder 1 bids α
(1+α)2
(i.e., her budget) and bidder 2 bids α2
(1+α)2
is a pure Nash equilibrium,
since the derivatives b2(b1+b2)2 − 1 and
αb1
(b1+b2)2
− 1 of the utilities of the bidders (as functions of their
strategies) are equal to zero. Observe that v1
(
1
1+α
)
significantly exceeds her budget for every value
of α. Hence, EW (b) = α(1+α)2 +
α2
1+α =
α+α2+α3
(1+α)2 . The optimal effective welfare is bounded by the
welfare at the state when bidder 1 bids her budget α(1+α)2 and bidder 2 bids 1− α(1+α)2 so that bidder 1
gets value equal to her budget. Hence, the optimal effective welfare is EW ∗ = 2α+α2+α3(1+α)2 . Clearly, the
ratio EW (b)/EW ∗ approaches 1/2 from above as α approaches 0. The theorem follows by selecting
α to be sufficiently small. ⊓⊔
5 Discussion and open problems
Our work leaves the obvious open problem of computing the tight bound on the price of anarchy over
coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria. So far, the only upper bound that is known is the counter-
example of 3/4 from [9] for pure Nash equilibria. Is 3/4 the tight bound for all equilibrium concepts
considered in the current paper? Actually, we have not been able to identify any coarse-correlated equi-
librium in the full information model that is non-pure. Do such equilibria really exist? Interestingly, we
show in Lemma 5.1 that mixed Nash equilibria coincide with pure ones. More generally, this statement
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applies to mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria in the budget-constrained setting (proof in Appendix B). Does
it extend to coarse-correlated ones? We believe that this is an interesting open problem.
Lemma 5.1 The set of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria in any proportional allocation game (possibly with
budget-constrained bidders) coincides with that of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria.
In the Bayesian setting, we have not considered more general equilibrium concepts such as coarse-
correlated Bayesian equilibria. The main reason is that our analysis requires that the expectation of
the sum of bids of the other bidders is the same for any possible valuation bidder i can draw from her
distribution; this property is not satisfied by more general equilibrium concepts. What is the price of
anarchy in this case? Interestingly, the answer cannot be 3/4 as our next counter-example indicates
(proof in Appendix C).
Lemma 5.2 There exists a proportional allocation game that has price of anarchy at most 0.7154 over
coarse-correlated Bayesian equilibria.
Also, recall that we have assumed that bidders have independent valuations. This is a typical as-
sumption in the Bayes-Nash price of anarchy literature [1, 3, 6, 10, 19, 21, 22] with [2] being the only
exception we are aware of. Unfortunately, our proof of the pure Bayes-Nash price of anarchy bound does
not carry over to the case of correlated valuations either (for the same reason mentioned above). Still,
we have not been able to find any counter-example with non-constant price of anarchy in this setting.
Again, what is the price of anarchy in this case? These questions are interesting in the budget-constrained
setting as well.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.1 for coarse-correlated equilibria
Let µ ∈ (1/3, 1] be a parameter whose exact value will be defined later. Consider a full information
proportional allocation game with n bidders in which bidder i has valuation function vi and budget ci
and denote by xi the resource fraction bidder i gets in the allocation that maximizes the effective welfare.
Let b be a coarse-correlated equilibrium inducing an allocation d = (d1, ..., dn) and let B =
∑
i bi be
the random variable denoting the sum of bids of all bidders, withB−i being the sum of bids of all bidders
besides bidder i. Let A be the set of bidders with E [vi(di)] ≤ ci. Clearly, for every bidder not belonging
to set A, it holds that
min{E [vi(di)] , ci} ≥ min{vi(xi), ci}.
Summing over all bidders not belonging to A (and multiplying by 1− µ), we obtain that
(1− µ)
∑
i 6∈A
min{E [vi(di)] , ci} ≥ (1− µ)
∑
i 6∈A
min{vi(xi), ci}. (8)
For every bidder i ∈ A, we distinguish between two cases. If µxiE [B−i] > ci, then clearly
E [ui(b)] ≥ 0
> ci − µxiE [B−i]
≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci} − µxiE [B−i] .
In order to prove the same inequality when µxiE [B−i] ≤ ci, we bound the utility of bidder i by the
utility she would have when deviating to bid µxiE [B−i] (which is within i’s budget ci). Using Lemma
3.1, we have again
E [ui(b)] ≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
E [vi(xi)]− µxiE [B−i] .
Summing this last inequality over all bidders of A, we obtain
∑
i∈A
E [ui(b)] ≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci} −
∑
i∈A
µxiE [B−i]
≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci} − µE [B]
∑
i∈A
xi
≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci} − µE [B] .
Using the equality B =
∑
i bi and linearity of expectation, this inequality implies that
∑
i∈A
(E [ui(b)] + µE [bi]) + µ
∑
i 6∈A
E [bi] ≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}.
Since E [ui(b)] + µE [bi] ≤ min{E [vi(di)] , ci} for every bidder in A (recall that µ ≤ 1 and vi(di) =
ui(b) + bi) and E [bi] ≤ min{E [vi(di)] , ci} for every bidder not belonging to A, the above inequality
yields
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(di)] , ci}+ µ
∑
i 6∈A
min{E [vi(di)] , ci} ≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci} (9)
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By summing (8) and (9), we obtain
EW (d) =
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(di)] , ci}+
∑
i 6∈A
min{E [vi(di)] , ci}
≥ 3µ− 1
4µ
∑
i∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}+ (1− µ)
∑
i 6∈A
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}
≥ min
{
3µ− 1
4µ
, 1− µ
}∑
i
min{E [vi(xi)] , ci}
= min
{
3µ− 1
4µ
, 1− µ
}
EW ∗.
Hence, the price of anarchy with respect to the effective welfare benchmark is bounded by the quantity
min
{
3µ−1
4µ , 1− µ
}
which is maximized to 7−
√
17
8 ≈ 0.3596 for µ = 1+
√
17
8 . ⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 5.1
Assume that there exists an incomplete information proportional allocation game (possibly with budget-
constrained bidders) that has a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium b in which bidder i bids two different
values y1 and y2 (with y1 < y2) with non-zero probability when her valuation function is vi; both values
are within the budget of bidder i (if any). We will show that this is not possible.
By the mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium condition, both y1 and y2 should yield the same maximum
expected utility U to bidder i, i.e.,
U = E [ui(y1, b−i)|vi] = E [ui(y2, b−i)|vi] .
Let B−i be the random variable denoting the sum of bids of all bidders besides bidder i and let f(y) =
E
[
vi
(
y
y+B−i
)]
be the expected value of bidder i when unilaterally deviating to bid y. Clearly, f is non-
decreasing. It is also concave in [y1, y2] since it is defined as the linear combination of concave functions:
for every value of B−i, vi
(
y
y+B−i
)
is a concave function with respect to y, and the expectation over
B−i is simply a linear combination over such functions. Clearly, E [ui(y, b−i)] = f(y)− y.
We furthermore claim that f is strictly increasing in [y1, y2]. If this was not the case, then due
to the concavity of f there should exist y′ ∈ [y1, y2) such that f(y′) = f(y2) and, hence, bidder i
could deviate to bid y′ (which is clearly within her budget, if any) for an improved expected utility
of E [ui(y′, b−i)|vi] = f(y′) − y′ > f(y2) − y2 = U . This would contradict the mixed Bayes-Nash
equilibrium condition.
The fact that f is strictly increasing clearly implies that Pr[B−i > 0] > 0. But then, for every
positive value of B−i, vi
(
y
y+B−i
)
is a strictly concave function of y and, subsequently, f is also strictly
concave as a linear combination of concave functions including strictly concave ones. Hence, there
exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that f(λy1 + (1 − λ)y2) > λf(y1) + (1 − λ)f(y2) and bidder i has a profitable
deviation to bid y′ = λy1 + (1− λ)y2 (which is again within her budget, if any) since
E
[
ui(y
′, b−i)
]
= f(y′)− y′
> λf(y1) + (1− λ)f(y2)− λy1 − (1− λ)y2
= λ(f(y1)− y1) + (1− λ)(f(y2)− y2)
= U.
We conclude that the support of any mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium cannot contain two different bid
values for bidder i when her valuation is vi and, subsequently (by extending the same argument to all
possible valuations of bidder i and to all bidders), it must be a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
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We remark that if the valuation functions are differentiable (we do not make any such assumption in
the above proof), a much simpler proof follows by observing that the utility of bidder i, when seen as
a function of bidder i’s strategy, has strictly decreasing derivative. Then, the utility is maximized either
by a bid equal to the budget of the bidder (if any) or at the unique bid that nullifies its derivative.
C Sketch of proof of Lemma 5.2
A vector of possibly correlated bid functions is called a coarse-correlated Bayesian equilibrium if no
bidder i has any incentive to unilaterally deviate to any deterministic bid strategy in order to improve her
expected utility (again, given the strategies of the other bidders), for any valuation she draws from her
probability distribution Fi. Coarse-correlated Bayesian equilibria are more general than mixed Bayes-
Nash equilibria since the bid functions of different bidders are not restricted to being independent.
Our counter-example has two bidders. Bidder 1 has valuation function x with probability p1 and ǫ1x
with probability 1−p1. Bidder 2 has valuation function αx with probability p2 and ǫ2x with probability
1−p2. We require 1 ≥ α and, furthermore, α is significantly larger than ǫ1 which in turn is significantly
larger than ǫ2.
We construct a coarse-correlated Bayesian equilibrium of the following form: When the valuations
of the bidders are x and αx, the bid strategies are γ and δ respectively. These values are significant and
yield constant resource fractions to both bidders. In all other cases where at least one of the bidders has
an almost zero valuation, the bids are extremely close to zero. However, the bidder that has significantly
higher valuation than the other submits a significantly higher bid (but still very close to zero) and gets
almost 100% of the resource. In the following, we round negligibly small bids or valuations to 0 and
treat an allocation of almost 100% of the resource to some bidder as exactly 100%. This rounding does
not affect the final result that we can obtain but a significantly more detailed (and tedious) calculations
are needed for a formal proof. So, we will assume that when the valuations are x or ǫ1x for bidder 1 and
ǫ2x for bidder 2, the bid strategies are (almost) 0 but the bid of bidder 1 is significantly higher so that she
gets (almost) 100% of the resource. Similarly, when the valuations are ǫ1x and αx, the bid strategies are
(almost) 0 but the bid of bidder 2 is significantly higher so that she gets almost 100% of the resource.
Notice that the expected utility of bidder 1 when her valuation is x is (approximately) p2 γγ+δ + 1−
p2 − p2γ and becomes (approximately) p2 yy+δ + 1 − p2 − y when deviating to a deterministic bid y.
We require that the first quantity is higher than the second one so that no such deviation exists, i.e.,
p2
γ
γ+δ − p2γ ≥ p2 yy+δ − y for every y ≥ 0. Similarly, we require that p1 αδγ+δ − p1δ ≥ p1 yγ+y − y. Note
that the right-hand side of the above constraints are maximized to (√p2 −
√
δ)2 and (√αp1 − √γ)2,
respectively. It remains to compute the exact bid values that satisfy these constraints and minimize the
price of anarchy. This is done in the following non-linear mathematical program
minimize
p1p2
(
γ
γ+δ + α
δ
γ+δ
)
+ p1(1− p2) + α(1− p1)p2
p1 + α(1− p1)p2
subject to: p2 γ
γ + δ
− p2γ ≥ (√p2 −
√
δ)2
αp1
δ
γ + δ
− p1δ ≥ (√αp1 −√γ)2
γ, δ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1
which has been solved using Matlab to give an upper bound of 0.7154 for α = 0.2913, γ = 0.1071,
δ = 0.1510, p1 = 0.6682, and p2 = 0.7616. ⊓⊔
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